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Plaintiffs and Appellants, PETRUS FAMILY TRUST DATED MAY 
1, 1991, and EDMOND A. PETRUS, JR., individually and as Co-Trustee of 
the Petrus Family Trust dated May 1, 1991 (together, "Petrus"), submit this 
Opening Brief on appeal from the summary judgment entered against them in 
their construction defect lawsuit against Defendant and Respondent, CHRIS 
KIRK d/b/a/ KIRK ENTERPRISES ("Kirk"). 
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Kirk built a home under contract to Nancy Gentry-Boyd ("Gentry-
Boyd"), completing construction in about August of 2005. Petrus bought that 
home almost seven years later, in April of 2012. A year and a half after that, 
in October of 2013, a contractor hired by Petrus to address a seemingly simple 
problem with a set of French doors, discovered latent defects in the property 
caused by poor construction. 
Petrus sued Kirk, asserting a cause of action for breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability. However, the district court (Judge Jason D. Scott 
presiding) ruled that Petrus's claim was "a contract action, not a tort action," 
and was therefore governed by Idaho Code section 5-241(b) (accrual of 
contract claims), and section 5-217 (the four-year statute of limitations on 
contract actions). Applying that analysis, the district court deemed Petrus's 
claim to be untimely, and granted summary judgment in favor of Kirk. 
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In this appeal, Petrus presents an issue of first impression for this 
Court, namely, whether a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability sounds in contract or in tort. Petrus submits that the only logical 
answer is that it sounds in tort. That conclusion, Petrus explains below, is 
compelled by important public policies (like protecting homeowners from 
catastrophic damages caused by large-scale builders) and by evolving case law 
from this Court on the subject (particularly Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps 
v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975) ("Salmon Rivers") 
(holding that any claim that does not require privity of contract must sound in 
tort), and Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987) 
("Tusch") (holding that a remote purchaser of a home can sue the builder for 
breach of the implied warranty, even absent privity of contract)). 
Thus understood as a tort, Petrus asserts that his claim against Kirk was 
governed by Idaho Code section 5-241(a) (a six-year accrual statute of 
limitations for tort actions relating to real estate investment), and section 5-
224 (a four-year statute of limitation where, like here, the plaintiff reasonably 
does not discover the latent defect before expiration of the six-year period), 
and should not have been dismissed. Accordingly, the order granting 
summary judgment should be reversed, and the case remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings on the merits. 
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II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The single legal issue presented by this case is framed by very few facts 
(as summarized above). They were presented thoroughly and fairly in the 
district court's Memorandum Decision and Order granting summary 
judgment, are undisputed, and are reprised here, very simply, as follows.! 
Kirk built the home at issue under an oral contract with Gentry-Boyd. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 562. Construction began in June of 2004, and was completed in 
August of 2005. R. Vol. 1, p. 562. 
Almost seven years later, in April of 2012, Petrus purchased the home 
from Gentry-Boyd. R. Vol. 1, p. 826. Petrus moved into the home in May or 
June of 2012. R. Vol. 1, p. 826. Soon thereafter, Petrus discovered that the 
French doors in the home were swollen with water, could not open or close 
properly, and could not be locked. R. Vol. 1, pp. 285-86, L. 116: 1-119:4; 826. 
A little more than a year after that, in October of 2013, a remediation 
contractor hired by Petrus to address the doors discovered extensive dry rot 
resulting from years of water intrusion facilitated by construction defects, and 
causing tens of thousands of dollars of damages. R. Vol. 1, p. 777. 
The district court's order regarding Kirk also resolved 
issues concerning Gentry-Boyd (the builder), and Kevin Batchelor 
(Petrus's real estate agent). Neither Gentry-Boyd nor Batchelor are 
parties to this appeal, so this brief does not discuss any of the facts or law 




The procedural history of this case as it relates to Kirk is also relatively 
simple. As summarized below, it involved: (A) Petrus's complaint, (B) Kirk's 
motion for summary judgment, (C) the district court's order granting summary 
judgment; and (D) the district court's order denying reconsideration. 
A. The Pleadings. 
Petrus filed his original complaint in March of 2014, asserting multiple 
claims against Gentry-Boyd (not relevant here). R. Vol. 1, p. 15. 
In September of 2014, Petrus filed a first amended complaint, adding 
Kirk as a party, and asserting claims against him for breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability and conspiracy to defraud. R. Vol. 1, p. 28. In 
September of 2015, Petrus filed a second amended complaint-the operative 
complaint for purposes of this appeal-again asserting two claims against 
Kirk for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and conspiracy to 
defraud. R. Vol. 1, p. 71. 
Kirk filed a general-denial answer to that complaint, which included the 
affirmative defense that Petrus' s claims were "barred by the applicable statute 
of limitations under 5-216, 5-218, 5-219, and 5-241, and other governing laws 
of the state ofldaho." R. Vol. 1, pp. 91, 96. 
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B. Kirk's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Discovery ensued and, in May of 2016, Kirk filed a motion for 
summary judgment. R. Vol. 1, pp. 532 (motion); 535 (supporting 
memorandum); 561 (Kirk declaration); 112 (attorney declaration). In sum, as 
it relates to this appeal, Kirk argued that the cause of action against him for 
breach of the implied warranty of habitability was a contract claim, governed 
by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Idaho Code section 5-217, 
and was therefore time barred. R. Vol. 1, pp. 551-53. 
Petrus opposed Kirk's motion. R. Vol. 1, pp. 571 (opposition 
memorandum); 823 (Petrus declaration); 598 (attorney declaration); 769 
(expert declaration, attesting to damage at Petrus's home); 775 (contractor 
declaration, attesting to discovery of the damage at Petrus' s home). In sum, 
Petrus argued that his claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability 
sounded in tort, that his claim did not accrue until he discovered the defects 
(in October of 2013), and, therefore, that his claim was timely under Idaho 
Code section 5-241(a) (the six-year accrual statute for torts) and section 5-224 
(adding four more years for latent defects). R. Vol. 1, pp. 584-89. 
Kirk filed reply papers, reiterating his central argument that Petrus' s 
claim sounded in contract and was governed-and barred-by the four-year 
statute of limitations. R. Vol. 1, p. 907. 
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C. The District Court Order Granting Summary Judgment. 
The district court heard oral argument on Kirk's motion on June 20, 
2016. At that hearing, Petrus' s counsel conceded that judgment should be 
entered in favor of Kirk on the conspiracy to commit fraud claim Tr. Vol. 1, 
pp. 7-8, the parties made their respective (and conflicting) arguments 
concerning the statutes of limitations applicable to Petrus' s implied warranty 
claim (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 71-75 (Petrus); 105-08 (Kirk)), and the district court 
ultimately took the matter "under advisement." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 112. 
On July 7, 2016, the district court filed its Memorandum Decision and 
Order, reciting the relevant facts (as related above), and turning first to what it 
called Kirk's "frontline argument" regarding the statute of limitations. R. Vol. 
1, pp. 967, 975. The district court fairly set forth the positions of both sides-
turning fundamentally on whether the claim for breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability sounded in tort or in contract-and opined that "Kirk 
hasthebetterhalfoftheargument." R. Vol. 1,pp. 975-77. 
Specifically, the district court concluded-based on "inferences" it 
drew from Tusch, "the 1987 case in which the Idaho Supreme Court extended 
to subsequent home purchasers the right to sue builders for breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability"-that: "Petrus's claim for breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability is a contract action, not a tort action." R. Vol. 
1, p. 977. On that basis, the district court ruled: "Hence, Petrus's claim is 
subject to section 5-241(b)'s completion-of-construction accrual rule, and to 
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section 5-217's four-year limitations period. Under those statutes, the claim is 
time-barred. Kirk therefore is entitled to summary judgment .... " R. Vol. 1, 
p. 979. 
On November 15, 2016, judgment was entered in favor of Kirk 
consistent with the order granting summary judgment. R. Vol. 1, p. 1003. 
D. Petrus's Motion for Reconsideration. 
On November 28, 2016, Petrus filed a motion for reconsideration, 
explaining that the district court's order conflicted with Tusch, and arguing 
that "the cause of action for breach of warranty cannot possibly accrue before 
the latent defect manifests itself." R. Vol. 1, pp. 1006 (motion); 1009 
(supporting memorandum). 
On December 5, 2016, the district court filed its Order Denying Motion 
for Reconsideration. R. Vol. 1, p. 1069. Again, the district court fairly 
framed the issue, but disagreed with Petrus, insisting that its approach to this 
unsettled question was "in keeping with Tusch." R. Vol. 1, p. 1071. 
Petrus then filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the judgment in favor 
of Kirk (R. Vol. 1, p. 1092), and the "unsettled" legal issue framed in the 
district court regarding the fundamental nature of the claim for breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability is now squarely presented for de novo review 
by this Court. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY 
Petrus's appeal is from a final judgment of a district court in a civil 
action and is appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 ("Appealable 
Judgments and Orders"). 
V. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether, in the context of a lawsuit brought by a remote 
homebuyer against a home builder, a claim for breach of the implied warranty 
of habitability arises in tort or in contract. 
2. Whether that claim for breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability is governed by statutes of limitations governing torts or governing 
contracts. 
VI. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In granting summary judgment in favor of Kirk based on its 
interpretation of the proper statute of limitations to apply to Petrus' s claim, the 
district court was ruling as a matter of law. Accordingly, the district court's 
ruling should be reviewed de novo. Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 279, 




Here, Petrus first provides background confirming that claims for 
breach of the implied warranties were historically considered tort claims. 
Next, Petrus traces the Idaho case law that leads to the inescapable conclusion 
that breach of the implied warranty of habitability must logically be regarded 
as a tort claim. 
Third, Petrus examines persuasive authority from other jurisdictions 
that expressly holds that such claims are governed by tort statutes of 
limitations. Finally, Petrus explains why summary judgment cannot be 
affirmed on the alternative basis (suggested by the district court) of the 
economic loss rule. 
A. The History of Implied Warranties. 
The historical origins of the claim for breach of the implied warranties 
does not control the present issue, but it is important background and helps 
inform the question of whether the claim is more akin to one sounding in tort 
or in contract. 
As explained by Dean William L. Prosser, to whom this Court has 
frequently looked for clarity in this area (see, e.g., Salmon Rivers, 97 Idaho at 
311-12), "[ t ]he action for breach of warranty was originally on the case, 
sounding in tort and closely allied to deceit .... " Prosser, The Assault on the 
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Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960) ("Prosser"). 
Presser's deep analysis also confirms as "undisputed" the fact that "the 
original tort form of action ... still survives to the present day, and may 
everywhere be maintained." Id. According to Prosser, this is not a "mere 
technical matter of procedure," as there are "many decisions which have held 
that the tort aspects of warranty permit the application of a tort rather than a 
contract rule, in such matters as the survival of actions, the statute of 
limitation, the measure of damages, or recovery for wrongful death." Id. 
( extensive citations omitted). 
While warranties originally arose as a tort concept, Prosser explains 
that the theory was later grafted into the law of contracts, almost as an 
addendum to the express warranties that accompany the sale of many goods. 
Id. at 1100. That, in tum, led to the recognition of implied warranties-first of 
title, and later of quality and habitability-which provided the foundation for 
Justice Cardoza's seminal decision in MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382, 
389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916), giving birth to the law of strict liability in 
tort. As Prosser explains it, "the old tort character has continued to color the 
substantive law of warranty itself," and "there are a great many cases ... in 
which to say that the warranty is a term of the contract is 'to speak the 
language of pure fiction."' Prosser, 69 Yale L.J. at 1127 (citation omitted). 
Prosser explains the point further like this: 
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[O]nce the contract action was established, it came 
into such universal and almost exclusive use that, in 
the minds of nearly all courts and lawyers, warranty, 
whether express or implied, became definitely 
identified with the contract, and regarded as an 
integral and inseparable part of it. This attitude 
persists to such an extent that the theory of warranty, 
far from being an aid to the recognition of strict 
liability to the consumer, has proved in many 
jurisdictions to be an actual deterrent; and in all 
probability this has considerably delayed any change 
in the law. Id. at 1128. 
Ultimately, Prosser observes that this hybrid concept of implied 
warranties has caused special confusion with respect to the defenses that ought 
to apply to any action upon those warranties. Specifically he mentions 
contributory negligence, but the same thoughts apply equally to the statute of 
limitations defense at the center of this case. Prosser asserts that "the 
confusion is merely part of the general murk which surrounds 'warranty,' and 
is another indication that that unhappy word is a source of trouble in this 
connection," that it "appears probable that ordinary rules applicable to the tort 
action will be carried over," and that "the assault upon the citadel of privity is 
proceeding in these days apace." Id. at 1147-48. 
Prosser spoke to this issue almost 70 years ago. The revolution he 
predicted has been slow, and has advanced at different speeds in different 
jurisdictions; but it has been decided, with an ever-increasing number of 
jurisdictions now permitting claims for breach of the implied warranties by 
remote purchasers, even absent privity of contract. Consistent with that trend, 
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this case now presents this Court with the perfect opportunity to revisit an 
issue it last teased 30 years ago in Tusch, and to validate the compelling public 
policies that favor holding builders accountable to remote but hapless 
homeowners, for whom a poorly constructed home can mean financial ruin. 
In the end, Petrus asks this Court to rule expressly that a claim for breach of 
the implied warranty of habitability arises in tort, and is therefore governed by 
the applicable statutes of limitations governing tort actions. 
B. Idaho Case Law Supports Petrus's Position. 
1. Tomita v. Johnson. 
Case law relevant to the issue presented in this appeal traces back to at 
least 1930 and the case of Tomita v. Johnson, 49 Idaho 643, 200 P. 395 (1930) 
("Tomita"). In that case, an experienced tenant farmer purchased potato seeds 
from his landlord, knowing they were partly spoiled and mostly diseased. A 
poor crop resulted, and the tenants sued the seller, asserting a claim based on 
allegedly defective seeds. The district court entered judgment for the seller, 
and the tenant appealed. 
This Court affirmed, finding that the tenant "was in no wise misled at 
the time of planting," and ruling that "under these facts he cannot recover crop 
damage resulting from planting the diseased seed in question." Tomita, 290 P. 
at 396. The Court explained that "[t]he substantive law applicable [to this 
case] is the law of warranty," that "there arises [in this situation] an implied 
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warranty that the seed is suitable for the purposes intended," and ( of greatest 
importance here) that "the right of action in damages for breach of such 
warranty accrues at the time it is ascertained by the purchaser that the seed is 
not as represented." Id. 
Precisely so, submits Petrus, just as his cause of action for breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability should not have accrued until it was 
ascertained by him, the subsequent purchaser, that the home was not fit for 
habitation. 
2. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft. 
Forty-five years later, in Salmon Rivers, this Court confronted squarely 
the anomalies inherent in implied warranties, this time in the context of a 
products liability action. In that case, the remote buyer of a Cessna airplane 
sued the manufacturer of the plane on an implied warranty theory to recover 
damages for only economic loss ( cost of repair and loss of use) allegedly 
caused when the plane had mechanical failure and crashed. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of lack of 
privity, the buyer appealed, and this Court ultimately affirmed. 
The analysis began with the observation that "[t]he role of privity in 
products liability actions remains an unsettled legal issue," and that the "action 
varies in fortune depending upon the type of recovery sought, the legal basis 
upon which the desired recovery is grounded, and the applicable statute of 
limitations." Salmon Rivers, 544 P.2d at 309. That said, this Court made 
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clear that the only issue before it presently was "whether a plaintiff may 
maintain an action against a manufacturer, with which it is not in privity of 
contract, to recover economic loss on the ground of breach of implied 
warranty within the contract statute of limitations [Idaho Code section 5-
217]." Id at 310. 
To answer that question, the Court alluded again to "the dual character 
of an action for breach of implied warranty as it has developed in American 
jurisprudence," and quoted Prosser for his observation that "consideration of 
an action grounded in breach of implied warranty can become complicated 'by 
the peculiar and uncertain nature and character of warranty, a freak hybrid 
born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract."' Id. at 311 ( citing Prosser, 
69 Yale L.J. at 1124-36). The Court cited further to Prosser for the 
propositions that "O]udicial utilization of the contract concept of warranty 
should not camouflage the fact that the courts employed the concept to permit 
a recovery in tort," and that "a plaintiff generally may base an action for 
breach of warranty on either tort or contract." Id. at 311 (quoting Prosser, 69 
Yale L.J. at 1126-27). 
Still, having noted the ambiguity, the Court then switched perspectives 
and looked to "courts and commentators" (in particular back to Prosser) for 
the conclusion that privity of contract "is required in a contract action to 
recover economic loss for breach of implied warranty." Id. at 312. According 
to the Court: "This conclusion primarily is founded upon a commercial nature 
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of such an action and upon the legal principle that a contract, even including 
its implied terms only arises from an agreement between two or more parties." 
Id. That conclusion also found support in "previous decisions of this Court in 
products liability actions to recover economic loss." Id. (citations omitted). 
In the process, however-and of particular importance to understanding 
the evolution of this issue and the essence of Petrus' s present appeal-the 
Court quoted Prosser again for the proposition that, where there is no privity, 
"liability to the consumer must be in tort and not in contract." Id. (emphasis 
added). And, although the Court made clear that "this case is not appropriate 
for deciding whether the statute of limitations . . . begins to run at the date of 
sale or at the date of discovery of the defect," it recognized its own previous 
ruling on that subject in Tomita, which, it said, "suggests a conclusion 
contrary to that for which the respondents argue" (that is, that the statute 
should not accrue until the particular defect is discovered). 
3. Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin: The Majority Opinion 
A dozen years after it decided Salmon Rivers, the Court returned to this 
implied warranty puzzle in Tusch, a case with facts that closely parallel 
Petrus's case. 
In Tusch, the plaintiff (Tusch) purchased several residential duplexes, 
and later discovered they suffered from "major structural infirmities." Id. at 
1023. Tusch sued the seller and the builder for negligence, misrepresentation, 
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breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty, in each instance 
claiming only economic loss in the form of lost rental income and property 
damage. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims (id. at 
1025); Tusch appealed; and this Court affirmed in part (as to the negligence 
and express warranty claims), and reversed in part (as to the misrepresentation 
and breach of implied warranty claims). 
With respect to Tusch's breach of implied warranty claim, the Court 
first considered the relevance of disclaimers and observed that "[b ]ecause the 
implied warranty of habitability is a creature of public policy, public policy 
indicates that it be waived only with difficulty." Id. at 1031. Since the 
implied warranties were not adequately waived, the Court turned to Tusch's 
implied warranty claim against the seller, and cited its decision in Bethlahmy 
v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966), which confirmed that "when 
builder-vendors sell newly constructed buildings there is an implied warranty 
that the building will be habitable." Id. at 1032. 
Most importantly for present purposes, the Court wrote at length about 
its own rejection of the doctrine of caveat emptor-a contract concept-"as 
applied to the sale of new houses." Id. Observing that its view was 
"consistent with the vast weight of authority," the Court stated that the "trend 
away from the doctrine of caveat emptor in transactions of this nature is 
rooted in considerations of public policy." Quoting from a Wyoming case on 
the subject, the Court commented as follows: 
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The mores of the day have changed and the ordinary 
home buyer is not in a position to discover hidden 
defects in a structure. A home buyer should be able to 
place reliance on the builder or developer who sells 
him a new home, the purchase of which in so many 
instances, is the largest single purchase a family makes 
in a lifetime. Courts will judicially protect the victims 
of shoddy workmanship. Consumer protection 
demands that those who buy homes are entitled to rely 
on the skill of the builder and that the house is 
constructed so as to be reasonably fit for its intended 
use. The average purchaser is without adequate 
knowledge or opportunity to make a meaningful 
inspection of the component parts of residential 
structure. Id. at 1032 (quoting Moxley v. Laramie 
Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1979)). 
The Court also looked to Richard Posner (the eminent University of 
Chicago law and economics professor, now Judge on the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals) to make the point that "economic policy considerations 
come into play as well." Id. Thus, the Court expressed agreement with the 
propositions that builder-vendors have "superior knowledge, skill, and 
experience in the construction of houses," are "generally better-positioned 
than the purchaser to know whether a house is suitable for habitation," are 
"better-positioned to evaluate and guard against the financial risk" posed by 
latent defects, and are better able "to absorb and spread across the market of 
home purchasers the loss therefrom." Id. at 1033 (quoting R. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed. 1977)). 
The Court then noted the "growing trend among other jurisdictions" to 
"extend the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers." Id. 
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Citing to consistent authority from Wyoming, New Jersey, Indiana, Arkansas, 
Oklahoma, Mississippi, and Texas, the Court quoted at length from yet 
another case, this one from the Arizona Supreme Court: 
The same policy considerations that lead to [ our 
adoption of the implied warranty of habitability for 
sales of new homes ]-that house-building is 
frequently undertaken on a large scale, that builders 
hold themselves out as skilled in the profession, that 
modem construction is complex and regulated by 
many governmental codes, and that homebuyers are 
generally not skilled or knowledgeable in construction, 
plumbing, or electrical requirements and practices-
are equally applicable to subsequent homebuyers. 
Also, we note that the character of our society is such 
that people and families are increasingly mobile. 
Home builders should anticipate that the houses they 
construct will eventually, and perhaps frequently, 
change ownership. The effect of latent defects will be 
just as catastrophic on a subsequent owner as on an 
original buyer and the builder will be just as unable to 
justify improper or substandard work. 
Because the builder-vendor is in a better position than 
a subsequent owner to prevent occurrence of major 
problems, the cost of poor workmanship should be his 
to bear. Id. at 1034 ( quoting Richards v. Powercrafi 
Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427 (1984)) 
(paragraphing added). 
Based on that logic, the Court "adopted the reasoning of these courts," 
with the single proviso that this "extension of liability" is "limited to latent 
defects, not discoverable by a subsequent purchaser's responsible inspection, 
manifesting themselves after the purchase." Id. at 1035 (quoting Barnes v. 
Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 277, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976)). And thus, the 
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Court held, "subsequent purchasers of residential dwellings, who suffer purely 
economic losses from latent defects . . . may maintain an action against the 
builder . . . of the dwelling based upon the implied warranty of habitability 
despite the fact that no privity of contract exists between the two." Id. at 
1035-36. 
The Court concluded that any other holding would "lead to an absurd 
result," explaining as follows: 
For example, suppose an unscrupulous builder 
constructed a home of inferior quality and sold it to 
another. Suppose further, that for whatever reason, the 
buyer after three months sold the home to a second 
purchaser. And one month later the foundation of the 
house split apart rendering the home valueless. Should 
the common law deny the subsequent purchaser a 
remedy against the builder merely because there is no 
privity of contract and because the damages happen to 
be purely economic, when it was the conduct of the 
builder which created the latent defect in the first 
place? Id. at 1036. 
With that, the Court held it was error to grant summary judgment in 
favor of the builder on Tusch's implied warranty of merchantability claim and 
remanded the case for further proceedings, exactly as Petrus is asking the 
Court to do in his case. 
4. Tusch: The Additional Opinions on Point. 
In addition to the majority opinion in Tusch (by Justice Donaldson), 
Justice Bistline, for himself and Justice Huntley, wrote a separate concurring 
opinion to note that Salmon Rivers had actually been overruled previously in 
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State v. Mitchell Construction Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984). But 
putting aside the "anomalies" Justice Bistline alluded to regarding the 
reporting of the Mitchell case, the important point here is that, even before 
Tusch, this Court was already moving in the direction of providing more 
protection for consumers who suffer economic loss like those incurred by 
Petrus. 
Justice Bakes also wrote a separate opinion in Tusch, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, calling it a "sheer contradiction" for the Court "to hold 
that a subsequent buyer has a cause of action against a builder 'upon the 
implied warranty of habitability' and then state that no privity of contract need 
exist between the two." Id. at 52. In the view of Justice Bakes, "the Court's 
action today is not based upon the well established and understood cause of 
action in contract for breach of implied warranty, but has created a new cause 
of action in tort." Id. And that, Justice Bakes warned, "will result in a great 
deal of uncertainty" because: 
The Court's opinion does not define what is required 
to establish a prima facie case under its new cause of 
action, or what the applicable burden of proof should 
be. The opinion is silent as to whether tort or contract 
statutes of limitations will apply in fact suggesting that 
may be neither would be applicable, but that some 
other "reasonable time" period might be. A limitations 
period which commences only upon the appearance of 
"latent defenses manifesting themselves within a 
reasonable time" will prove to be the most elusive part 
of the Court's opinion today. Id. 
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Justice Shepherd also wrote a dissenting opinion in Tusch, rebuking the 
Court for "continu[ing] its recent trend in creating new causes of action where 
none had previously existed," and stating he would "decline to extend the 
doctrine of implied warranty of habitability to the circumstances of the instant 
case." Id. at 54. 
In sum, it has been 30 years since this Court broke new ground and 
definitively ruled-based primarily on reasons of public policy-that a remote 
purchaser of a home can maintain a cause of action against the builder based 
on the implied warranty of habitability, even without privity of contract. This 
case now presents the Court with the opportunity to make express what logic 
and the law both compel, that this "new" cause of action is one that arises in 
tort, and one that must, therefore, be governed by tort statutes of limitations.1 
5. Post-Tusch Case Law Confirms Its Central Ruling. 
Since deciding Tusch in 1987, this Court has returned periodically to 
the unique issues raised by implied warranty claims (particularly whether they 
arise in tort or contract, and whether they are governed by the economic loss 
2 In this respect, the Court is referred to Bishop v. Owens 152 
Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012), which includes an informative 
discussion concerning the hybrid character of a claim for professional 
malpractice, depending on the context of the exact claim asserted. Of 
particular interest here, note that the Court observed that "professional 
malpractice actions traditionally have been characterized as tort actions in 
the context of the statute of limitations." 
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rule. See, e.g., Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 983 P.2d 848 (1999) 
("Ramerth"); Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Donnelly, 154 Idaho 
499, 300 P.3d 31 (2013) ("Employers MutuaI"); American West Enterprises, 
Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155 Idaho 746, 316 P.3d 662 (2013) ("American West"). 
The upshot of those cases is that the Court has not overruled the general 
rule established by Salmon River, and that privity of contract is still required 
in most implied warranty contexts ( dealing with ordinary product defects, 
commercial transactions, and "services" cases). But the cases also all show 
fidelity to the holding in Tusch, and acknowledge implicitly that the same 
rules do not apply the context of homeowners and the implied warranty of 
habitability. For instance, in Ramerth, the Court validated the Salmon Rivers 
holding; but it also cited favorably to Tusch, recognized that Tusch was "not a 
goods case," and expressly acknowledged that "there may be cases where the 
plaintiff may be unfairly prejudiced by the operation of the economic loss rule 
in combination with the privity requirement articulated in Salmon Rivers. 
Given such a case, further relaxation of Salmon Rivers may be justified." Id. 
at 198. 
In Employers Mutual, the Court confronted whether damages awarded 
by a jury on a breach of the implied warranty of workmanship claim arising 
out of a construction contract were more in the nature of contract damages or 
tort damages (important for insurance purposes). The Court stated that the 
"key determination" is whether the duty is based upon a contractual promise 
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or if the duty can be maintained without the contract. Employers Mutual, 154 
Idaho at 505. The Court observed that the jury found that the breach 
"occurred with regard to [the contractor's] performance under the remodeling 
contract," and noted that that there was "no duty beyond the contractual 
promise between [the contractor and the plaintiff]." Accordingly the court 
found the damages to be contract damages (and hence not covered by the 
insurance policy at issue). Here, Petrus's case-for breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability-did not arise by contract. 
In American West, the Court revisited this string of cases (including 
Salmon Rivers, Tusch, and Ramerth) in the context of an ordinary commercial 
case to recover the cost of a tractor engine. The trial court dismissed the 
plaintiff's claim based on the implied warranty of merchantability because 
there was no privity between the buyer and the defendant, and this Court 
affirmed on that claim. In the process, the Court reprised again its own ruling 
in Salmon Rivers, noted that that case "narrowly considered the type of action 
involved [a products case]," and "limited its ruling" to cases involving "an 
action against a manufacturer." However, the Court alluded again to the 
"complicated nature of warranty cases as a hybrid creature of contract and 
tort," and noted that the outcome in Salmon Rivers "was based primarily on 
the commercial nature of the action and on the principle that the implied terms 
of a warranty can only arise from an agreement between two or more parties." 
Id. at 750. The Court also noted expressly that "privity of contract is required 
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in a contract action to recover economic loss for breach of implied warranty, 
potentially unless the application of this rule would have the effect of unfairly 
prejudicing the plaintiff." Id. 
Petrus' s points here are simple. Privity of contract may still be required 
to recover economic loss in most breach of implied warranty cases; but the 
implied warranty of habitability is unique, and exists between a buyer and 
even a remote seller as a matter of law, apart from contract, as a matter of 
compelling public policies. In sum, this is "that case"-anticipated more than 
40 years ago in Salmon Rivers, but alluded to again as recently as 2013 in 
American West-where a plaintiff has been "unfairly prejudiced by the 
operation of the economic loss rule in combination with the privity 
requirement," or where "application of [the privity rule] would have the effect 
of unfairly prejudicing the plaintiff." This, then, is the case where this Court 
should revisit this important area of law, and should rule expressly not just 
that a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability arises in tort, 
but that it logically then is governed by tort statutes of limitations. 
C. Persuasive Authority from Other Jurisdictions Supports Petrus. 
In each of the cases discussed above, this Court has considered 
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions to inform its own analysis in this 
evolving area of the law. In that spirit, Petrus examines several cases from 
other jurisdictions that have ruled-consistent with his theory of this case-
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not only that the implied warranty of habitability is a tort, but also that it is 
governed by tort statutes of limitations. 
For instance, in Richman v. Watel, 565 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1978), 
plaintiff sued the builder of a new home for breach of the implied warranty o 
habitability when the floor in the front part of his home collapsed. The trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the builder on the basis of the 
four-year contract statute of limitations; but a Texas Court of Civil Appeals 
reversed, ruling that: "The breach of the implied warranty of fitness arising 
from the construction and sale of a new house is considered to be a tort rather 
than a contract concept," and ruling further that the limitation "commences on 
the breach of implied warranty when the buyer discovers or should discover 
the injury." Id. at 102 (citing Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (1968)). In 
language that should apply equally to the dry rot and water intrusion that 
damaged Petrus's home, the Court explained: 
The failure of defendant to properly vent the 
foundation did not give rise to a cause of action at the 
time, thus plaintiffs' cause of action accrues and the 
statute of limitations begins to run when damages are 
sustained, here when the floor collapsed. Id. at 103. 
In Texas, the law in this area is settled beyond dispute. For example, in 
Gibson v. John D. Campbell and Co., 624 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App. 1981), an 
owner brought an action against a builder for breach of the implied warranty 
of habitability, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
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builder, and the owner appealed. The issue on appeal was whether the 
evidence was sufficient to resolve when the owner should have realized the 
alleged defect, but the Court began its opinion by observing: "Both parties 
agree that the statute of limitations governing breach of implied warranty of 
habitability begins to run when the buyer discovers or would have discovered 
the injury." Id. at 731 (citing Richman, 565 S.W.2d at 102). 
Similarly, in Swaw v. Ortell, 137 Ill.App.3d 60,484 N.E.2d 780 (1984), 
the buyers of a house sued the builder, alleging the house was not habitable. 
The trial court dismissed the buyer's second amended complaint, but the 
appellate court reversed in part. With respect to the buyer's claim for breach 
of the implied warranty of habitability, the Court ruled: 
The applicable statute of limitations is the 5 years 
provided in section 15 of the Limitations Act for 
actions to recover damages for an injury done to 
property, real or personal. The accrual of a cause of 
action starts the limitations clock. Under the discovery 
rule, a cause of action does not accrue until a person 
knows or reasonably should know of his injury and 
also knows or reasonably should know that it was 
wrongfully caused. The discovery rule applies to 
actions against contractors for failure to construct or 
design a building properly. Id. at 70 ( citations 
omitted). 
In sum, Petrus knows that Idaho is sovereign, that authority from out-
of-state does not control, and that Idaho law must evolve at its own speed and 
in its own direction. Still, Petrus suggests that the logic of the four cases 
discussed above is compelling, and strongly supports his argument here. That 
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is, the claim for breach of implied warranty, at least as to a remote purchaser, 
cannot possibly be a contract claim because there is no privity between the 
buyer and the seller. Rather, the claim exists in the first place because it 
serves larger public policy goals, and it is, in that respect, a tort. And a tort, 
Petrus submits, must logically be governed by the statutes of limitations that 
govern torts. 
D. The Economic Loss Rule Does Not Support Summary Judgment. 
Kirk's motion for summary judgment was based primarily on the 
statute of limitations argument discussed above. R. Vol. 1, pp. 551-53. As 
explained, the district court agreed, ruling that "Petrus' s claim is subject to 
section 5-241(b)'s completion-of-construction accrual and to section 5-217's 
four-year [contract] limitations period." R. Vol. 1, p. 979. However, the 
district court added a single-sentence, sua-sponte footnote after that, stating: 
"If that claim sounded in tort, it seemingly would be analogous to a claim for 
negligent construction," and "would be barred by the 'economic loss rule' in 
any event." R. Vol. 1, p. 979. See also R. Vol. 1, pp. 1073-74 (where the 
district court reiterated that conclusion in denying Petrus's motion for 
reconsideration). That off-hand statement, however, cannot possibly justify 
affirming the summary judgment in favor of Kirk at this stage of the 
proceedings. 
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First, the district court's comments conflict directly with Tusch, which 
held specifically that "subsequent purchasers of residential dwellings, who 
suffer purely economic losses from latent defects manifesting themselves 
within a reasonable time, may maintain an action against the builder ... of the 
dwelling based upon the implied warranty of habitability despite the fact that 
no privity of contract exists between the two." Tusch, 113 Idaho at 50-51. 
The Tusch Court explained that conclusion with this rhetorical question 
(quoted previously, at p. 22): "Should the common law deny the subsequent 
purchaser a remedy against the builder merely because there is no privity of 
contract and because the damages happen to be purely economic, when it was 
the conduct of the builder which created the latent defect in the first place?" 
Id. at 51. The answer was no there, and it should be no here. 
Even if Tusch were not so clear, Kirk never raised the economic loss 
rule in his motion for summary judgment below, and neither the facts nor the 
law on this theory were developed sufficiently to permit the district court to 
rule upon it. Specifically, there was no evidence before the trial court 
confirming exactly what the nature or scope of Petrus' s damages were. And, 
as Petrus explained in his motion seeking reconsideration, the economic loss 
rule is not absolute in any event. 
For instance, case law recognizes that the economic loss rule does not 
apply where there is a "special relationship" between the parties. Blahd v. 
Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300, 108 P.3d 996, 1000 (2005) 
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("Blahd'). As explained in Blahd, that term "refers to those situations where 
the relationship ... is such that it would be equitable to impose such a duty .. 
. . " Id. at 301. And, while that exception has been interpreted narrowly in the 
past, it should be now deemed to apply here, particularly in light of Tusch 
(which was based entirely on the equities, and which found the duties inherent 
in the implied warranties to run from a home builder directly to a subsequent 
purchaser). The exception precisely fits the pattern of the case law identified 
in Blahd, given that builders (like Kirk) are "professionals or quasi-
professionals," and "hold themselves out to the public as having expertise 
regarding a specialized function." Id. 
The Court in Blahd also recognized an exception for "unique 
circumstances requiring a different allocation of risk." Id. at 302 ( citing Just' s 
Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 
(1978)). And in Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho 
22, 28, 244 P.3d 166, 172 (2010), the Court identified an exception for torts 
arising where economic loss exists but is parasitic to property damage or 
personal injury (issues that Petrus never had the opportunity to present facts 
on or to brief in the district court, given that Kirk's motion did not raise this 
issue at all). 
Ultimately, in this appeal, Petrus asks the Court to reexamine a large 
body of case law dealing with the devastating issues confronting buyers who 
conduct responsible home inspections, but later face financial ruin due to the 
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negligent conduct of mass builders who cut comers and construct homes with 
latent defects, certain to manifest down the road. That, Petrus submits, creates 
a "special relationship," and illustrates the sort of "unique circumstances 
requiring a different allocation of risk" that should render the economic loss 
rule inapplicable here. In the end, it would be utterly inconsistent for Tusch to 
expressly permit a remote homeowner to maintain a claim for breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability-necessarily in tort, because there is not 
privity with the builder-but then to dismiss the claim because the buyer has 
only economic loss. 
E. Public Policy Supports Petrus's Right to Recover. 
Decades before it decided Tusch, this Court recognized the particular 
public policies that come to bear in the context of home buyers and home 
builders. For instance, in Bethlahmy, the Court recognized the "trend in 
judicial opinions to invoke the doctrine of implied warranty of fitness in cases 
involving sales of new houses by the builder." Id. at 67. According to the 
Court: 
The old rule of caveat emptor does not satisfy the 
demands of justice in such cases. The purchase of a 
home is not an everyday transaction for the average 
family, and in many instances the most important 
transaction of a lifetime. To apply the rule of caveat 
emptor to an inexperienced buyer and in favor of a 
builder who is daily engaged in the business of 
building and selling houses, is manifestly a denial of 
justice. 
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In Tusch, the Court referred favorably to Bethlahmy, and quoted 
extensively from Moxley, 600 P.2d at 735, to make these points: 
The mores of the day have changed and the ordinary 
home buyer is not in a position to discover hidden 
defects in a structure. A home buyer should be able to 
place reliance on the builder or developer who sells 
him a new home, the purchase of which in so many 
instances, is the largest single purchase a family makes 
in a lifetime. Courts will judicially protect the victims 
of shoddy workmanship. Consumer protection 
demands that those who buy homes are entitled to rely 
on the skill of the builder and that the house is 
constructed so as to be reasonably fit for its intended 
use. The average purchaser is without adequate 
knowledge or opportunity to make a meaningful 
inspection of the component parts of a residential 
structure. Id. at 735, footnote omitted. 
The opinion in Tusch also noted that, in this context, "economic policy 
considerations come into play as well." Tusch, 113 Idaho at 47-48. Looking 
again to Prosser, the Court considered that home builders have "superior 
knowledge, skill, and experience in the construction of houses," that they are 
"generally better positioned than the purchaser to know whether a house is 
suitable for habitation," and that they are "better positioned to evaluate and 
guard against the financial risk posed by [latent defects], and to absorb and 
spread across the market of home purchasers the loss therefrom." Id. at 48. 
In the end, this case illustrates perfectly the concern raised by this 
Court in Tusch when it posed the rhetorical question of whether the common 
law should deny the subsequent purchaser (here, Petrus) a remedy against the 
builder (Kirk) "merely because there is no privity of contract and because the 
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damages happen to be purely economic, when it was the conduct of the 
builder which created the latent defect in the first place." Tusch, 113 Idaho at 
51. The answer is, it should not. Home builders owe purchasers and 
subsequent purchasers an implied duty that the homes they build are habitable. 
Public policy then demands that any claim for breach of that duty cannot 
possibly begin to run until the breach manifests itself and is either known or 
should reasonably be known to the home buyer. 
Here, the effect of the district court's ruling is that the statute of 
limitations on Petrus' s claim against Kirk had already expired before Petrus 
even bought the house. That makes no sense at all, and the result does not 
serve the indicated public policies of protecting homeowners and holding 
builders accountable. The district court's ruling on summary judgment does 
not withstand scrutiny, and cannot be allowed to stand. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
Petrus, of course, had no contract with Kirk; he was not in privity with 
Kirk; and his action against Kirk should not be misconstrued to be based on 
contract. It is not. It is based on a warranty, implied by law, and enforced by 
courts as a matter of public policy. It is intellectually inaccurate, then, to treat 
the claim as one arising in contract, or to restrict it by any defenses-statutes 
of limitations included-intended to apply to contract actions. 
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For those and all the reasons stated, above, Petrus respectfully submits 
that the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling that his claim for 
breach of the implied warranty of habitability was governed by the statute that 
controls actions on a contract, rather than those that control actions on a tort. 
The ruling of the district court should be reversed, and the matter remanded 
for further proceedings on the merits. 
Dated: August 18, 201 7 
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